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Abstract: Vehicular Ad hoc Networks (VANETs) become a very crucial addi-
tion in the Intelligent Transportation System (ITS). It is challenging for a
VANET system to provide security services and parallelly maintain high
throughput by utilizing limited resources. To overcome these challenges, we
propose a blockchain-based Secured Cluster-based MAC (SCB-MAC) pro-
tocol. The nearby vehicles heading towards the same direction will form a
cluster and each of the clusters has its blockchain to store and distribute
the safety messages. The message which contains emergency information and
requires Strict Delay Requirement (SDR) for transmission are called safety
messages (SM). Cluster Members (CMs) sign SMs with their private keys
while sending them to the blockchain to confirm authentication, integrity, and
confidentiality of the message. A Certificate Authority (CA) is responsible for
physical verification, key generation, and privacy preservation of the vehicles.
We implemented a test scenario as proof of concept and tested the safety mes-
sage transmission (SMT) protocol in a real-world platform. Computational
and storage overhead analysis shows that the proposed protocol for SMT
implements security, authentication, integrity, robustness, non-repudiation,
etc. while maintaining the SDR. Messages that are less important compared
to the SMs are called non-safety messages (NSM) and vehicles use RTS/CTS
mechanism for NSM transmission. Numerical studies show that the proposed
NSM transmission method maintains 6 times more throughput, 2 times less
delay and 125% less Packet Dropping Rate (PDR) than traditional MAC
protocols. These results prove that the proposed protocol outperforms the
traditional MAC protocols.
Keywords: Ad hoc networks; data security; digital signatures; distributed
storage; intelligent vehicles; vehicular ad hoc networks; wireless
communication
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1 Introduction
Vehicular Ad hoc Networks is an especial type of dynamic wireless network, designed to
provide a communication infrastructure between vehicles. Inside a VANETs system each device
needed to be well equipped to exchange information (send and receive) with other vehicle’s drivers
or vehicles within their reach. The IEEE 802.11-2016 standard [1] provides MAC and physical
layer protocols for VANETs.
VANETs are targeted to provide safety, efficiency and Infotainment. Collision warn-
ing, safe-distance information, congested road notification, risky vehicle warning, road bar-
rier/obstacles/block notification, signal/rule violation warning etc. are emergency notifications
which are transmitted between vehicles to alert each other by using different VANET proto-
cols. These are called safety messages. Moreover, infotainment can be delivered by incorporating
commercial service information, gas station/parking/restaurants/hotel information, media content
download, multiplayer games, etc. Those are categorized as the non-safety message. Safety mes-
sages always get priority for transmission as fail or delay distribution of those messages may result
in severe accidents, traffic jam, etc. Processing all types of messages together will increase the traf-
fic and harm the throughput and overall performance. Because during transmitting, it is required
to follow Strict Delay Requirements (SDR) of 100 ms for safety message [2]. Contrastingly, NSM
is comparatively less important than safety message and does not require SDR to follow.
To maximize the throughput and minimize transmission delay & PDR Cluster-based (CB)
protocols could be a better solution for VANET [2]. The nearby vehicles heading towards the
same direction could form a cluster to transfer information among themselves. Although CB
systems are easier to manage and simultaneously appropriate for resource utilization and perfor-
mance enhancement, traditional CB systems are suffering from some shortcomings like hidden
node problems, traffic overloading, packet dropping, etc. CB-MAC protocol [2] has overcome
the shortcomings of CB systems and proposed a complete solution for VANET. By using their
Non-Safety Message Transmissions (NSMT) protocols, it improved the communication quality by
increasing the throughput and decreasing transmission delay & Packet Dropping Rate (PDR).
Adding the security attributes like confidentiality, authenticity, reliability, transparency, integrity
etc. to the CB-MAC system could assure security with good performance.
However, safety messages are very crucial for VANET systems and should be protected from
any kind of attacks. Attackers could modify message contents and generate false messages or can
provide false replies by using a man-in-the-middle attack [3]. Those security leaks may result in
fatal accidents.
Meanwhile, the popularity of blockchain is increasing because of its distributed features
and the secured storage service for P2P communication. Blockchain is considered as immutable
ledgers and ensures important security services [4,5]. All data and transactions are stored as
chained blocks and it is not possible to edit or delete any information after being stored, which
ensures the integrity, immutability and trustworthiness. These features motivate us to employ
blockchain in the proposed system to store safety messages. A Public Key Infrastructure (PKI)
based digital signature algorithm is used to ensure the authentication of the cluster members and
also to provide communication security. Additionally, we propose a Certificate Authority (CA)
for physical verification of the vehicles and to generate a public-private key pair for each of
the vehicles. In this paper, to increase throughput by ensuring security services, we propose a
Secure Cluster-based MAC (SCB-MAC) protocol for vehicular ad-hoc network. The target is to
introduce the security features to the SMT of VANET systems. Handling safety and non-safety
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messages separately, providing signature-based security during cluster joining and communication,
blockchain-based decentralized and distributed storage of the messages and vehicles registration
and physical verification are the novelty introduced in this paper. As a Proof of Concept (PoC),
we implement an Ethereum blockchain in virtual machines with Cluster Members (CMs) and CH
to simulate the SMT. The scenario is tested in a real-world Ethereum test network named Rinkeby
test network [6].
The contributions of the paper are the followings:
• We propose a blockchain-based Secured Cluster-based MAC protocol (SCB-MAC) for
VANETs. SCB-MAC defines the formation of the cluster, handshake methods, safety and
non-safety message transmission in details. We have modified some of the control packets
formats of IEEE 802.11 to allow blockchain and to support those methods.
• We propose blockchain to store and distributes the safety messages of clusters to provide a
decentralized environment while ensuring robustness, temper resistance, immutability, fair-
ness and transparency of the safety messages. The blockchain is hosted in the cloud and
the corresponding CH and CMs will communicate with it by using high-speed internet. All
the CMs including CH are considered as the full node and anyone can initiate a transaction
on the blockchain to inform a safety message. Blockchain will generate block from each of
the safety messages and broadcast it to all the CMs including CH.
• We have employed a PKI based digital signature method to ensure the authenticity of
cluster members as well as to provide communication security. During cluster joining com-
municating with the blockchain server, digital signature is used to ensure user authentication
and integrity, confidentiality, nonrepudiation of the message.
• We introduce CA to register and verify vehicles. Additionally, it is responsible to generate
public-private key pair for each of the vehicles and to ensure the safety, security and
preservation of their privacy.
We have discussed some cluster based VANET systems with their performance and security in
the related work section (Section 2). Research paper where blockchain is employed for VANETs
is also added in that section. The system structure is demonstrated in Section 3. The tools used
for implementation and experimental setup details are discussed in Section 4. The performance
analysis of the proposed SCB-MAC protocol is demonstrated in Section 5. Security analysis of
the proposed method is presented in Section 6. In Section 7 we present the conclusion of the
paper with some possible future works.
2 Related Works
Cluster-based systems are proved very useful for VANETs. The quality and performance
improvement by using a cluster-based architecture in VANETs can be found in [7]. Yang
et al. [8] proposed a cooperative Clustering-based Medium Access Control (CCB-MAC) protocol
to enhance the trustworthiness of emergency message broadcasting by improving their reception
rate. In [9], the researchers presented a multi-channel CCB-MAC which also improves the reliabil-
ity with QoS support with the help of cooperation between the members. The authors in [10] also
proposed a cluster-based multichannel MAC protocol where they developed an analytical model
to find out suitable window size for the MAC protocol to balance between the delay and the
successful delivery rate. A hybrid cluster-based protocol is proposed for safety message transmis-
sion by [11] which improves the network stability and increase channel utilization by selecting the
cluster head according to the mobility factor of the vehicles. Due to lack of neighboring node,
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TDMA protocols are not able to utilize all the time slots of a frame. The [8–11] do not have
efficient resource utilization capability.
In [12], researchers proposed DMMAC, which is also a cluster-based MAC protocol by utiliz-
ing Fuzzy logic Inference System (FIS). But their method is applicable only for emergency/safety
messages. A multihop-cluster based hybrid architecture is presented for the safety message trans-
mission to minimize the connection overhead and PDR [13]. In [14], the researchers combine the
clustering protocol and carry-and-forward schemes for highway VANETs. Reference [14] shows
improvement in data download volume and throughput but information about network delay and
packet dropping rate is not mentioned.
The strict delay constraint for the safety message transmission is 100ms, but the presented
methods do not satisfy this credential. Additionally, [8,11–13] provide solution only for safety
messages and does not concern about the general messages or non-safety messages. Thus, in
this paper, we propose a cluster-based method where safety and non-safety messages are handled
separately according to their importance. Rather than following the traditional MAC protocols, a
blockchain-based method is proposed to ensure the SDR for safety message transmission.
Zhang et al. [15] presented a Data Security sharing and Storage system based on the Consor-
tium Blockchain (DSSCB). They utilize the temper-proof and security features of blockchain to
store authentication information like identity and keys with location, direction, current position
and rule violation information of the vehicles. Similarly, Javaid et al. [16] use blockchain to store
registration and status information of vehicles in their DrivMan system. To ensure the trust of
vehicles, a video storage system was proposed by Xie et al. [17] where vehicles use their onboard
camera to capture video of the surroundings and send it to a blockchain to store. The stored
information is used to analyze the behavior of vehicles to find any unwanted or malicious behav-
ior. Wagner et al. [18] proposed a method to ensure the integrity of the event messages. Blockchain
is used to store the reputation score of the vehicles which is updated after each transaction. Zhang
et al. [19] utilized blockchain to store important traffic event information like traffic violation
and accidents. They use Mobile Edge Computing (MEC) for computational support, but because
of MEC, the system is not fully decentralized. Another blockchain-based message dissemination
service was proposed in [20,21]. Blockchain is used to store the verified event information to
ensure the security and trust of the system. Another event validation mechanism is proposed by
Yang et al. [22] where RSUs broadcast event messages to the vehicles and vehicles use PoW to
verify the trustworthiness of that event. To implement a scalable system, they use local blockchain
to provide quick response to the local vehicles and then all the local RSUs synchronized the data
into the global blockchain. But the infrastructure cost for RSU and resources are high, thus in
most of the cases vehicles have to pay a good amount of money for that [23]. To handle the huge
workload of event data, Singh et al. [24] presented branch–based technology with blockchain in
where blockchains are divided into branches and each branch is responsible to provide services in
different geographical areas. To increase the scalability, some researchers use multiple blockchain
to store different information separately [25–27].
In the above-mentioned research, different types of blockchain are used for different purposes.
However, none of them differentiates between message or event types. If all the transmitted mes-
sages or event information are stored together in the blockchain with proper security encryption
services, the time and storage overhead of the system must be high. It results to decrement of
throughput and increment of delay. To minimize the difficulties of consensus and mining [18]
minimize the difficulty to 4 leading zeros while [24] set it to 3. Blockchain could be the best
solution to provide security, integrity, availability, transparency, robustness etc. But without proper
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management, the performance could be very low. Thus, we propose a blockchain to store the
safety messages. Non-safety messages are not stored in the blockchain as they are less important
and consume too much storage.
3 System Structure
The nearby vehicles heading towards the same direction will form a cluster. All the vehicles
are well equipped with necessary hardware and software resources to send and receive messages
including OBU, Sensors, Global Positioning System (GPS) and high-speed internet connection.
The vehicles are physically verified by a Certified Authority (CA). CA also generates and assigns
a public-private key pair to each vehicle and all the vehicles will be known as their public key. CA
is considered as secured enough to preserve the privacy of the vehicles. A graphical representation
of clusters is presented in Fig. 1a. Among the vehicles, one will be elected as Cluster Head (CH)
and others become Cluster Member (CM). By this way, a centralized system is formed where all
the NSMTs between CMs will be handled by the CH as an access point. Every cluster owns a
blockchain to store the safety messages. All the CMs including CH are considered as a full node
and anyone can initiate a transaction in the allocated blockchain to inform about an emergency.
Vehicles will sign the message with their private keys to confirm their identity and to ensure non-
repudiation. The blockchain server will check the authentication and then generates block from
the message and broadcasts it to all the members. Details of the system model are discussed in
the following subsections.
Figure 1: (a) Application scenario, (b) modified control packet format for SCB-MAC
3.1 Formation of SCB-MAC Cluster
SCB-MAC is a cluster-based system with some modification from the traditional IEEE802.11
standard (see Fig. 1b). In this section, we will discuss the details of cluster formation and
related details.
3.1.1 Cluster Membership
To join a cluster, an isolated vehicle has to broadcast a control message called Request to
Cluster Formation (RTCF) in the network. Cluster Information (ClI) and the vehicle’s public key
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i.e., the Member’s Public Key (MPK) are included in the RTCF. Then, CH of the nearby cluster
sends back a (Registration to Cluster) ReTCl packet to the isolated vehicle by informing about
the cluster, Public key of CH and the Address of the Blockchain (BCA) assigned to that cluster.
The new member id of the vehicle is also included in the ReTCl. To ensure authenticity, CH signs
the BCA with its private key. The newly joined member has to decrypt it by using the public key
of CH and then registered to the assigned blockchain. A vehicle can receive multiple ReTCl, in
that case, the vehicle will calculate the time interval between sending and receiving of the control
messages and join the cluster where the delay is minimum. If no cluster is present nearby and the
vehicle considers itself as CH and starts a new cluster. Then it can apply to the server to allocate
a blockchain for the newly formed cluster. The new CH will broadcast the ClI in the network
and wait for some CMs to join. Unified Modelling Language (UML) is used to sketch the FSM
of the proposed SCB-MAC protocol (see Fig. 2).
Figure 2: Finite state machine of the proposed SCB-MAC protocol
3.1.2 CH Election and Cluster Merging
An active but isolated vehicle will broadcast RTCF and wait for ReTCl to join an existing
cluster as a CM. But if it does not receive any ReTCl and SIFS timeout occurs, the vehicle
becomes CH to form a new cluster. If multiple CHs come very closer and start using the same
channels, CHs will receive control messages from each other. Then all the CHs those who realize
the existence of cluster(s) will broadcast a control message called Request to Cluster Merging
(RCIM). Inside RCIM, CH includes Cluster’s Member Information (CMI) to inform the number
of CMs active under its cluster. After receiving the RCIM, Cluster(s) with a lower number of CMs
will join to the cluster with the largest number of CMs. All the CMs including the CH(s) will join
as new CM. Newly joined CMs will exchange RTCF and ReTCl with the CH to complete the
merging process. CH of the previous cluster will initiate a transaction in the current blockchain
to synchronize the valid safety messages from the previous blockchain.
3.1.3 Leaving a Cluster
For different circumstance, anyone can leave a cluster and then the CMs list is updated
dynamically. Cluster leaving may be required in four situations and those are demonstrated in
Fig. 3. While the CH sends RTS to a CM and does not receive any CTS even after retransmission,
CM will be considered as out-of-reach (see Fig. 3a). Similarly, while the CH sends RTS on
behalf of a sender CM to receiver CM and does not receive any CTS even after retransmission,
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destination CM will be considered as out-of-reach (see Fig. 3d). If there is no ACK received from
a CM after broadcasting and resending a message, that CM will be considered as out-of-reach
(see Fig. 3b). If the CH is out of reach and a CM does not receive any CTS even after the
retransmission the CM will initiate a cluster leaving process (see Fig. 3c).
Figure 3: Cluster leaving processes while (a) no CTS is received from a CM, (b) no ACK is
received from a CM, (c) no CTS is received from the CH and (d) no CTS is received from the
CM(D)
3.2 Safety Message Transmission (SMT)
Collision warning, safe-distance information, congested road notification, risky vehicle warn-
ing, road barrier/obstacles/block notification, signal/rule violation warning etc. are considered as
emergency or safety messages. These types of messages have strict delay requirement which is
100 ms [2]. The safety messages should come from a valid source and stored in such a way
that, if one or multiple cluster members (including the CH) leave the cluster, the safety messages
should not be lost. Traditional cluster-based systems are managed by a central node and thus the
possibility of single point-of-failure is high. Blockchain is a perfect solution for these obligations
as it provides data storage and management system in a distributed environment.
When any isolated vehicle become a CH, it will communicate with the server to get the
network address of an available blockchain. The server will provide an address where the smart
contract for the SMT was previously deployed. If the CH was a member of any previous SMT
blockchain, it will copy the related and valid safety messages to the newly created blockchain as
transactions. Whenever a CM wants to join the cluster and shares its public key, CH will send
the sever credentials of the blockchain by signing it using the CH’s private key. The CM will
connect with the blockchain server and then it will synchronize to receive all the existing safety
messages of the blockchain. All the CMs including CH are independent nodes in the blockchain
and everyone can perform transactions in the blockchain to inform others about a safety message.
Each safety message is generated by a smart contract as a transaction and stored chronologi-
cally as a block in the blockchain. After any block is generated, all the CMs will get notification
about the newly created safety message in block form. If any CM has validity expired information
for a particular safety message, it will request for another transaction in the blockchain to
mark the message as invalid. For example, whenever a vehicle changes a lane it will generate
a transaction but when the vehicle will move to another lane the previous information become
invalid. Thus, it will generate an invalid transaction and the block will be marked as invalid. As
the messages consume very small storage, the block will not be removed from the blockchain.
However, the information stored in the block could be used by the law enforcement authority to
investigate different occurrence like an accident, traffic jam etc.
236 CMC, 2021, vol.68, no.1
3.3 Non-Safety Message Transmission (NSMT)
The non-safety message transmission will be unicast to and fro a CM or a CH. There are
three categories of unicast and corresponding transmission is briefly discussed here. From CH to
CM, there is a direct unicast from CH to CM. CH verifies transmission using ACK. The data
is routed via CH as a CM cannot send non-safety messages directly to another CM, rather they
send it to the CH and CH will be responsible to broadcast messages to the destination CM.
On the other hand, CH can transmit non-safety messages to neighbour clusters’ CH by using the
RTS/CTS mechanism. Fig. 4a–4c shows the handshaking between the members of the proposed
NSMT protocol.
Like traditional MAC protocols, if all the CMs are transmitting messages to each other there
will be duplicate message exchanges and hidden node problem is possible to occur. Moreover, with
the increment of the number of vehicles a huge flow of messages will be generated which increase
the chance of collisions and transmission delay [2]. Thus, in the proposed method, CM has
the responsibility to handle the non-safety message communication and rather than broadcasting
immediately CH sends to one CM at a time and waits until receiving an ACK from that CM.
After the ACK is received it will send the message to another CM. It is possible to set the
maximum number of retransmission limit for NSMT, and if an ACK does not receive by the CH
within that time, it will retransmit the message until the limit. Fig. 4d shows the flowchart.
Figure 4: (a) Handshake between CH and CM during NSMT, (b) flowchart of the NSMT method
4 Implementation
For the proposed SMT of the SCB-MAC protocol, we present a Proof of Concept (PoC)
implementation by using the Ethereum blockchain. Generally, the transactions are performed by
miners who are also members of the blockchain. But in the proposed system, as the vehicles
are the members of the blockchain and many of the vehicles do not have the capability to
mine blocks, we have introduced a server which will perform the mining tasks on behalf of the
vehicles. Moreover, online computing service providers also maintain a distributed service. Thus,
our proposed system is decentralized and distributed as the data are not stored in the server
or a specific location rather stored in all the vehicles storage. A Virtual Machine (VM) was
configured with Ubuntu-18.04.4-desktop-amd64 to host the Ethereum blockchain and also act as
a miner. Two other VM is considered as CH and CM. Registration to the blockchain and message
transmission is tested with this setup. We are going to describe the details of the implementation
in this section.
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4.1 Tools
We implemented the SMT module of the SCB-MAC protocol by using the Truffle framework.
It’s a well-known testing framework for Ethereum blockchain which provides all the facilities to
manage smart contracts, automated testing of the codes, deploy smart contracts in Ethereum
blockchain [28]. To emulate and test the smart contracts into a blockchain, the truffle suite offers
Ganache [29], a virtual private Ethereum blockchain. Ganache offers special features to examine
the blocks and transactions, blockchain log to analyse the responses and debugging information in
the popular platforms like Windows, Mac OS and Linux. The vehicles use metamask wallet [30] to
connect with virtual private blockchains. It provides all the wallet facilities to access, control and
pay to the blockchain-based applications. Metamask comes in the form of a browser extension and
also available for iOS and Android as apps. Not only the main Ethereum network but metamask
also provide the facility to connect with different test networks including custom RPC (Remote
Procedure Call). A Node Packet Manager (NPM) is used to executes JavaScript in the proposed
method [31]. To interact with the smart contract, we developed the client-side in HTML by using
Lightweight NPM Server [32].
4.2 Experiment
In a typical VANET system, all the vehicles may not have the mining capabilities. Thus,
in the proposed system, one or more servers are used to perform mining on behalf of the
vehicles. It could be an external EDGE server (like [17,20,21]) or an existing blockchain server
(like [6,33]) which is available online. To test our proposed system in both environment we present
two different experimental setups. In the first setup, we are considering a dedicated EDGE server
as miner (configured in a virtual machine). Moreover, In the second experiment, a real-world
platform (Rinkeby test network) is considered as blockchain server to perform mining.
4.2.1 Ganache Test Server
To implement the SMT module we prepared a VM as blockchain server with Ubuntu-18.04.4-
desktop-amd64 installed. First, we install ganache and consider it as a blockchain of a particular
cluster. Then, we install NPM as it is a prerequisite to rum truffle framework and then install
the other dependencies. In the SMT blockchain, there are two types of operations. First one is
to store a safety message and the second one is to mark it as invalid when the impact/validity of
the message is no longer valid. Thus, we write a smart contract which consists of three functions.
One to view the existing blocks, the second one to add a safety message in the blockchain and
the third one to mark a safety message as invalid. The SC is written in solidity and deployed into
the blockchain by using truffle.
Next, in the CH and CM virtual machines, we install metamask Ethereum wallet extension in
the Firefox web browser. In the metamask, we use the custom RPC option to connect the ganache
blockchain server which is running in the server VM with a customisable port number. The CM
and CH used their public keys to register with the blockchain. We considered that the CM and
CH are verified by CA. Thus, the CM and CH have the permission to perform operations in the
blockchain. Ganache provides 100 ethers to CM and CH to pay the fees i.e., the gas during a
transaction. After testing it in the local VM, we found that all the functions are running fine and
ready to deploy in a real-world platform.
4.2.2 Rinkeby Ethereum Testnet
To deploy smart contracts and execute transactions in a real-world platform, we have used
Rinkeby [6], which is an Ethereum test network. It is one of the popular test networks used
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by blockchain developers. By sharing the account information in the social network, we have
earned some virtual currency i.e., ether which is usable only for Rinkeby. Although the earned
ETHERs for Rinkeby are valueless in the real world, to perform any transaction and smart
contract deployment we need those ETHERs to pay the gas price.
We have tested our smart contract in the Remix IDE (integrated Development Environment)
which is a platform independent environment [34]. It’s a web-based service which provides different
compiler versions to run smart contracts and execute blockchain transaction. After deploying
the smart contract and performing some operations in the Rinkeby testnet by using Remix IDE,
details report about the blocks and transactions can be found in the etherscan web site [35]. The
reports include the timestamp, transaction fee, gas limit, gas fee, block number, hash values of
transactions etc.
5 Performance Analysis
The performance analysis of the proposed SCB-MAC protocol is divided into two parts.
Firstly, we will demonstrate the performance of the SMT protocol which includes the computa-
tional overhead analysis of the digital signature and key generation algorithm. Storage overhead
due to Ethereum blockchain is also presented in that section. Then we will discuss the perfor-
mance of the NSMT protocol by comparing the throughput, PDR and delay with the traditional
MAC protocol.
5.1 Performance Analysis of the SMT Protocol
To ensure security, integrity and authenticity of the transferred message whenever any CM or
CH wants to initiate a transaction in the blockchain, it signed the message with its private keys
as a proof of authenticity. Similarly, during the first communication with a CM, CH sends BCA
inside ReTCl by signing it with CH’s private key. In both situations, the system uses RSA-1024
algorithm. The security strength i.e., the difficulty of breaking the key is measured in bits and
according to NIST [36], the security strength of RSA-1024 is 80 bits. That means to break the
key attacker have to perform at least 280 operations. According to some reports 80-bit security is
considered as below standard, but for the system with lower computational power like VANET,
IoT, etc. that would be considered secured enough. However, Singh et al. [37] presented RSA-1024
with the security level equal to the symmetric key size of 112-bit. In SCB-MAC, vehicles use
high-speed internet connection to communicate with the blockchain and the propagation delay
considered ignorable.
5.1.1 Computational Overhead
For a computer with more than 1.5 GHz clock speed, RSA-1024 with 80 bits security would
take 1.48 ms for signing and 0.07 ms for verification [38]. So, it is possible to sign and verify
a message within 1.55 ms. However, to calculate the signature and verification time for RSA-
1024 with 112-bit security three intelligent vehicles are considered with different computational
resources. Processing speed and RAM of the vehicles are presented with their time required to
sign and verify a safety message of 24-bytes are presented in Fig. 5. For IV1, IV2 and IV3 it
requires 32.34, 28.27 and 19.32 milliseconds respectively to complete sign and verification process.
As the strict delay constraint for the SMT is 100 ms, it is possible to sign and verify at least 64
messages by using RSA-1024 signature method (with 80-bit security). However, while the security
strength is considered 112-bit, it is possible to complete 3 to 5 transaction. From the previous
works we have found that the average delay for safety messages of [10] is 151 ms and in [39] it
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is also more than 100 ms. So, the SMT time is good enough to maintain the SDR. However,
it is possible to hire multiple EDGE servers to improve the scalability of the system. During
cluster joining i.e., the registration processes the time required for signature and verification is
32.34 ms for a low configured vehicle (see Fig. 5). That means it is possible to register more than
30 low-configured vehicles per second. This is a minimum cost to ensure security, integrity and
authenticity. The CA use a key generator to provide public and private key pairs for vehicles. The
key generation time for RSA-1024 is 97 ms for a computer with a 3.1 GHz processor and 4.0 GB
of RAM [37]. So, it can generate at least 10 keys per second.
Figure 5: Signature and verification time required for various intelligent vehicles
5.1.2 Storage Overhead
Block header of the Ethereum blockchain is approximately 508 Bytes [40]. In Ethereum, every
block consists of a single message. In the worst case, if a safety message block is generated in
every 5 s (12 in a minute), the storage overhead is 508× 12× 60× 24= 8.37 MB/Day. Therefore,
the proposed method requires a small amount of storage and possible to store them for a long
period. However, when there remains no member in a cluster, the server reset the blockchain
by archiving all the blocks in a cloud. Thus, too much storage support is not required for the
proposed SMT protocol.
5.2 Performance of the NSMT Protocol
In SCB-MAC safety messages will be transmitted by using high-speed internet which will
remove workloads from the internal network which results in an increment of throughput and
decrease of PDR and delay during NSMT. In this section, we will present the performance
analysis of the NSMT and compare it with the traditional MAC system. A numerical analysis is
presented with arbitrarily distributed
A numerical analysis is presented with arbitrarily distributed n number of vehicles which are
moving through a multi-lane road. Speed of the vehicles are considered as 100 km/h and the width
of the road is 5 m. Vehicles are moving in almost the same speed and their transmission area
is 500 m. If these parameters are changed, performance will be changed too. Details about their
impacts are discussed in [41,42]. Tradition MAC protocols for VANETs are studied in [2,41,43].
We used these studies and data to compare our method with the traditional MAC protocols.
However, in the context of this paper sensitivity test is not going to add any new value as the
comparison will not be fair. More importantly, sensitivity test would have been apt if there were
similar blockchain-based MAC protocol for VANET. The analysis is performed in MATLAB and
the considered value of parameters are presented in [2].
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5.2.1 Throughput Analysis of the NSMT Protocol







Here, Ps = Probability of successful transmission, Pbusy = At least one transmission is in
progress, L=Transmitted packet length, Pi = Probability that the channel is idle, Tslot = Slot time,
Te = Expected time to spend in a state, Tspan=Time span of slot, Ts=Time span for successful
transmission and Tc =Time span if there is collision.





Fig. 6a shows that the throughput for SCB-MAC (NSMT) is comparatively higher than
traditional MAC-based methods. In traditional MAC, CH broadcasts all the messages immediately
which increase collisions and throughput decrease quickly. When the number of vehicles is small,
cluster size will be small. A small cluster could not be able to utilise the available radio resources
due to an inadequate number of vehicles in the cluster and low traffic demand generated in the
cluster [2]. Therefore, throughput is lower than traditional MAC protocol.
Figure 6: (a) Throughput, (b) PDR and (c) delay comparison between SCB-MAC and tradi-
tional MAC
Firstly, as the safety messages are not using the internal network, the load of messages
are less. Secondly, rather than broadcasting immediately SCB-MAC uses RTS/CTS to check the
existence of the CMs first and then transmits to remove the hidden node problem. Thus, the
increment of throughput is significant but with the increment of vehicles, collisions are also
increasing which decrease the throughputs gradually for all types of systems. For example, while
the number of vehicles reaches to 40, traditional MAC protocol is overloaded and too much col-
lision decreases the throughput to almost 0 while proposed SCB-MAC can maintain a throughput
rate near to 6 Mbps. Moreover, the maximum throughput of the SCBMAC protocol is about
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12 Mbps for NSMT, where previously proposed methods like [7,11,14] have achieved 1.1, 1.3 and
11 Mbps respectively.
5.2.2 Packet Dropping Rate of the NSMT Protocol
To calculate PDR of the network the following equations are derived in [2]:
PDRnsd = (1−Ps)Mrnsd (3)
where Mrnsd are the maximum retransmission limit for NSMT. To ensure the availability of safety
messages there is no limit for retransmission, which increase overhead and increment of PDR. In
the proposed method, safety messages are not using the internal network which decreases the PDR
rate of the network. Thus, PDR is less than traditional MAC in the proposed method although
the retransmit limit is the same. Fig. 6b shows that the PDR for the proposed SCB-MAC is near
to 0 until the number of vehicles reaches to 30 and after that, it increases but always less than
traditional MAC protocols.
5.2.3 Delay Analysis
In [2], Shah et al. presented the transmission delay of a cluster-based system could be
calculated as:













Fig. 6c shows the average packet transmission delay against the number of vehicles. As the
proposed method uses RTS/CTS handshake before sending any non-safety messages, initially the
transmission delay is a little higher than the traditional MAC protocol. But with the increment of
the number of vehicles, the traditional MAC system faces rapid increment of transmission delay
because of collisions, while SCB-MAC keeps it manageable.
5.2.4 Results and Discussions
The cluster-based protocol is based on IEEE802.11 Distributed Coordination Function [DCF].
Performance of the IEEE802.11 can be found in [43–49]. NSMT achieved maximum throughput
of 12 Mbps, while some previously proposed method achieved [7,11,14] have achieved 1.1, 1.3
and 11 Mbps respectively. Increasing number of messages increases collisions which result to
decrement of throughput and increment of PDR and delay. For SCB-MAC the internal network
will be available only for non-safety messages because the safety messages will be transmitted by
the internet. Therefore, the full network is available only for non-safety messages and that results
in throughput increment. Maintain a throughput of 6 Mbps for NSMT, while the number of
vehicles reaches to 40. In the same state throughput of traditional MAC protocol is close to zero.
SCB-MAC is free from hidden node problem as only live nodes could receive non-safety messages
which are achieved by RTS/CTS handshaking. By removing hidden node problem SCB-MAC can
minimize PDR and transmission delays. When the total number of vehicles is 50, the transmission
delay of the MAC protocol reaches to double (800 ms) than the proposed protocol.
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6 Security Analysis
In this section, we will discuss the security features of the SCB-MAC protocol. Blockchain
with CA and public key infrastructure provide strong security to the transferred safety messages.
The security features are the followings:
6.1 Source Authentication and Non-Repudiation
We propose a PKI based digital signature method which is considered as secure until the
attacker succeeds to get the private key. Each of the vehicles is physically verified by CA during
registration. CA is responsible to ensure the safety and security of identities. To perform a
transaction in the blockchain a vehicle has to encrypt the safety messages by using its private key
to confirms its identity and nonrepudiation. The blockchain server will verify the vehicle’s identity
before creating a block.
6.2 Privacy Preservation
The real identity of the vehicles is securely stored by CA by mapping it with their public key.
The vehicles use to communicate with others by using their public keys to disclose their original
identity to the public. Therefore, even if an adversary could get the public-private key pairs it
is not possible to guess the real identity of the vehicles. The proposed SCB-MAC ensures the
privacy of the vehicles with the help of CA.
6.3 Security, Integrity and Confidentiality of Messages
All the SMTs are encrypted by RSA-1024 cryptographic algorithm which ensures security,
integrity and confidentiality of the messages. RSA-1024 considered strong enough as the key
attacker have to perform at least 280 according to [36] or 2112 according to [37] operations to
break the keys. The blockchain server checks for the integrity of the message by matching the
hash value by decrypting the message. Any modification affects the hash value and that message
will be rejected.
6.4 Attack Prevention
PKI based digital signature algorithms are considered as secure until an attacker creaks the
private key [50]. So, the communication channel used in SCB-MAC is theoretically secured. It also
prevents the messages from being modified and fabricates by comparing the hashing value. Even
if the adversary got the public-private key pair, it is not possible to get the hash of the former
block in the blockchain. So, a fabricated message with wrong hash value will be rejected. So, reply
attack from an unknown source similarly rejected. Moreover, the digital signature-based system
prevents impersonate attack because it is not possible to generate a valid signature on behalf of
a vehicle. However, CA confirms the physical identity of the vehicles and the blockchain server
checks the authentication information before block generation. No unauthorized entity, as well as
no vehicles with multiple fake identities, could perform any operation in the system. Thus, we can
say that the system is free from Sybil attack or unknown source attack.
Additionally, SCB-MAC can prevent DDoS attack as the blockchain never accepts any unau-
thorized entity to perform any operation and they will be blocked by the server from sending
further messages to the blockchain. DDoS, man-in-the-middle attack, Sybil attack, replay attack,
etc. are the attacks that can harm a VANET system [51]. By using public-key cryptography based
digital signature, SCB-MAC is safe from these attacks. Additionally, proposed signature method
does not depend on verifier table, thus the system is safe from stolen verifier table attack.
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6.5 Decentralization, Flexibility, Temper-Resistance, Immutability, Fairness, Transparency, Robustness
SCB-MAC utilizes the features of blockchain. It provides a decentralized and distributed
environment to store data in a platform-independent and flexible way. Ethereum platform can
be accessed by using metamask wallet [30], which could perform operations from any kind of
computers and mobile devices using any operating system like Windows, MAC, Linux and any
cell phone that uses iOS or Android. All the members have a copy of all the blocks in the
blockchain, which prevent the system from single-point-of-failure and provides robustness. The
storage structure of blockchain is chronological which is ensured by hashing. It does not allow
anyone to change the content even the sequence of blocks which ensures immutability and tamper-
free storing of the safety message. All the members in the cluster are equally treated while
operating on the blockchain to ensure the fairness of the system. By using smart contracts, a
vehicle could disable the safety message which is no more valid. In that case, the message is
still stored in the blockchain and every member can see it as an invalid message. Even if any
blockchain is reset, data blocks of it are archived in the cloud under the supervision of the CA.
It could be used in future for accident investigation, traffic violation, etc. This storing method
could help law enforcement authority during the investigation of accidents.
7 Conclusion
For VANETs, cluster based VANET systems are performing very well to reduce PDR, increase
throughput and maintain hard time constraint for SMT. To keep the performance of the cluster-
based system and introduce security features in it, SCB-MAC is proposed. Firstly, an Ethereum
blockchain is used to store and distribute the safety messages in a decentralized environment
with flexibility, temper-resistance, immutability, transparency and robustness features. Secondly,
a PKI based digital signature algorithm (RSA-1024) is used to ensure the authentication, non-
repudiation, integrity and confidentiality of the safety messages. Thirdly, a CA is responsible to
generate asymmetric keys for the vehicles and to preserve the privacy of the vehicle’s real identity.
The blockchain is implemented and tested in a realistic platform. The results show that it is
possible to complete 65 message transmission within SDR of 100 ms. Therefore, the introduction
of blockchain with digital signature method does not harm the SDR for SMT. Moreover, by using
secure vehicles registration process it is possible to register 30 vehicles in every second. SCB-MAC
provides source authentication, privacy preservation of the vehicles, attack prevention with the
typical facilities of blockchain, digital signature methods. Numerical analysis is presented to check
the performance of non-safety message transmission protocol and found that it performs better
than the traditional MAC protocol in terms of throughput, delay and PDR. When the transmis-
sion rate of the traditional MAC protocols fall down to zero, the proposed NSMT maintain a rate
of 7 Mbps and when the number of vehicles reaches to 50, transmission delay increases to 800 ms
for MAC protocols while proposed method faces a delay of 400 ms only. Moreover, the PDR of
NSMT is zero while the traditional MAC protocols’ PDR reached to almost 60%. In future, we
will try to implement a light-weight consensus method for blockchain to ensure the trustworthiness
of vehicles. Additionally, we are planning to find a suitable communication protocol to exchange
messages between the blockchains from neighbour clusters and also the feasibility of a secured
protocol for the non-safety message will be tested in future.
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